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Introduction
The growing interest in distributive work , both spatially and temporally, and the
implications for travel behaviour, represents an important example of the need to study
the interactions between agents rather than assume their independence . Interactions
between an employer and an employee are part of every day working life  and represent a
complex and authentic process in organisational decision making . Other complex
interactions concern those between an employee and the members of their household.
Two interactions of particular interest are between the travel-related work preferences of
an employee and the work practices policy of an employer, and between employees in
multi-worker households.
Decision making about distributing work involving agency interdependency includes
negotiation, bargaining and some  arbitration between an employee and an employer .
Agency interdependency also occurs between individuals in a  household who are affected
by the choice made by the employee member(s) of the household . Interactive agency
decision-making leading to choices may not produce each agent’s preferred outcome.
These outcomes are well encapsulated by a non-zero sum cooperative game of the Nash
bargaining equilibrium structure  (Gibbons 1992, Nash 1950). This regime is typically
non-compliant with a competitive market where non-interactive specifications of discrete
choice models can safely be assumed for modeling the choice process of each agent in
the decision chain. That is, the situation where an employee chooses an option offered by
an employer from a universal finite choice set in a strictly competitive regime under
random utility maximisation .
Reality typically involves  situations where employees through overt and/or informed
experience have limited their choice set to a subset of distributed work options including
the null situation (often referred to as choice through bounded rationality). As far as is
known, any effort to model the choices of employers, employees and other household
members with respect to the spatial and temporal nature of work activity ( and
consequent implications for travel behaviour), have treated each agent as a mutually
exclusive  element in the decision chain. Bernadino and Ben-Akiva (1996) come close
with the analysis of a sample of employers and employees from the same organisation,
but the links between an employee and their immediate supervisor are not analysed
because the employees and employers were treated as separate samples. Only where
agent independence is assured in a true competitive market can each observation be
treated in the same manner as in traditional discrete choice models.  From an econometric
viewpoint, the market is best described as one depicting a host of different distributed
work offers. Within the process of these offers,  agency interdependencies are revealed
through negotiation and bargaining to impose a non-independence  structure on choices
made between an employee and an employer , and between an employee (or commuter)
and other members of their  household.
This paper develops a framework within which multiple agents make discrete choices in
respect of a common objective - the determination of participation in distributed work,
including the opportunities and constraints  associated with telecommuting. I deas in
discrete choice theory and game theory are integrated to define a set of choice
experiments in which employees , in single and multi-worker households, interact with
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employers in arriving at a choice path in a distributed work context. The controlled
experiments are empirically implemented on a n exploratory sample of employees and
employers in Sydney. The complexity of a stated choice experiment with offers and
feedback necessitates a small  sample at this stage in exploring the potential of interactive
agency choice experiments (IACE’s).
The focus of the paper is on a situation in which  negotiation and deals are the rule in
agent choices in distributed work opportunities , in contrast to open-market competitive
decision making. The theoretical framework uses ideas from game theory, discrete
choice models with relatively free covariance structures ( e.g. across-agent correlation),
and forward-backward linking stated choice experiments capable of evaluating
sequential-move and ‘one-shot’ simultaneous  move negotiation regimes. The literature in
integrating these three threads of a more realistic representation of complex decision
making, involving interdependent agency choice, is recent. The framework offers a new
challenge for anyone seeking to improve on both understanding and prediction of travel
behaviour choices.
The paper is organised as follows: firstly, a  conceptual framework establ ishing the nature
of the problem, followed by secondly, a theoretical framework for choice making under
distributed work regimes. Thirdly, a structural model of interacting agents’ choices and
details of the design of a controlled experiment that integrates both market information
and stated preference data is specified . This model includes consideration of the
dynamics of interaction in an experiment. Fourthly, t he empirical study is defined as a
sample of observed interacting employees and employers , followed by the analysis and
key results. A set of concluding comments highlight the major findings .
Establishing The Nature Of The Problem: Time, Place
And Distance
The spread of business activities in time, place and distance is more and more prevalent
in organisations as management disperses production and distribution processes over
distance, both nationally and internationally. In the past, management sought to locate
their business activities with a view to minimising costs associated with distance, given
the existing or anticipated information flows (Charles 1981). Although decentralised
business activities and managerial practices have been conducted for some time in
western society, the emergence of new telecommunications technologies has radically
enhanced management’s capacity to distribute their work processes throughout a
metropolitan area and beyond the urban fringe.
Distributed work begins to realise a ‘virtual’ work organisation amongst managers,
workers and technology, enabling them to perform work that may be at variance spatially
and temporally with each other. The distributed work context can be another
organisation (e.g. network organisations), another workplace (e.g. home, car, telecentre)
or another work site (e.g. customer service outlet) (Venkatesh and Vitalari 1992).
Distributed work has come about due to:
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1) an increasing perception that information is a significant economic resource necessary
for business competitiveness
2) the practical consequences of conducting business over distance (Salomon and
Schofer 1988, Warf 1989, deWaard 1997, Saxena and Mokhtarian 1997, Kitamura et
al 1991, Handy and Mokhtarian 1995, US Department of Transportation 1993).
As information technology makes work and customer activities more location
independent, distributed work will prove a greater incentive for employers. In many
nations, governments are calling for better managed enterprises to provide greater
organisational flexibility and improved employee relations ( Karpin 1995). Organisational
flexibility is highly significant in the face of intense competition and increased labour
costs which are placing pressure on management and unions to raise productivity,
increase flexibility and quality of outputs (Porter 1990). Distributed work is one way of
addressing these initiatives providing management is prepared to engage in appropriate
work redesign (Brewer 1993, 1994, 1995; Brewer and Hensher in press; Harrison 1994).
The choice to distribute work processes or not depends on management’s capacity to
operate and manage internal, inter-workplace and inter- organisational relationships and
communications in the broadest sense. Capacity refers to organisational flexibility in
terms of restructuring operations, redesigning work, changing technologies and assisting
people in relocating business activities to take advantage of transport and
telecommunications networks (McKay 1988).
Telecommuting
The focus of this paper is on telecommuting as an example of a technology supportive of
distributed work processes with direct relevance for travel behaviour. Telecommuting is
not limited to computer-based work and includes cognitive-based tasks such as thinking
and writing (Mokhtarian 1991). Defined in a transportation context, telecommuting
captures the ‘telecommunications-transportation tradeoff’ (Kraut 1989, Salomon and
Mokhtarian 1997), as well as the potential generation of complementary travel activities.
Telecommuting means a reduction in either the number of commute trips for a home-
based worker or in the distance travelled to work for a telecentre worker (Handy and
Mokhtarian 1996). Telecommuting can also lead to increases in other complementary
travel activity such as short local non-commuting trips from home during the
telecommute day. Activities that define telecommuting and non-telecommuting are
difficult to distinguish when taking into account work-related trips such as visiting
clients, customers or contract workers working at home.
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Transport Demand Strategy
Telecommuting, making commuting to and from work less significant, leads to a change
in travel behaviour of workers and the subsequent impacts on traffic mix in urban areas.
The linkage between saved travel due to telecommuting and possible changing non-work
travel activity is crucial in understanding the contribution of telecommuting to improving
air quality and reducing global warming. T here is an expanding literature which suggests
the potential causal linkages between alternative organisational structure, work
organisation, distributed work, travel behaviour, and environmental impact . The
importance of these relationships is highlighted by increasing evidence that the greatest
potential for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and local air pollution due to the car, in
particular, and all passenger transport in general, is through improvements in car
technology and flexible work arrangements , the latter defined spatially and temporally in
it most broadest sense (Hensher 1993, Niles 1991). Although car technology is
contributing less pollution in the 1990s than in previous decades, their ever-increasing
numbers and the growth in annual kilometres travelled means that improvements in air
quality are likely to be short-lived ( Hensher et al. 1997). One important way to address
this significant problem is to investigate travel behaviour associated with telecommuting
and the implications of the substitution of non-commuting travel activity for ‘saved’
commuting activity with distributed work processes. The majority of these journeys are
by car with a resulting decline in public transport use . One negative impact anticipated
with the implications of distributed work on travel behaviour is the increase in non-
commute trips (Niles 1991).
Understanding Incentives and Constraints On Telecommuting
All artefacts of work design centre on a series of time-place-distance dimensions which
in turn pose opportunities and constraints. These dimensions of place-distance-time limit
the way managers and employees imagine how work can be done as well as the way they
design business practices, organisations, communication technologies and perceptions of
travel behaviour.
Place, distance and time are reflected in the way work is structured. Distance is
important in terms of the perceived need for control of a person’s position in the
organisational hierarchy and output. Place is important in terms of the perceived need for
proximity in workplace relationships such as face-to-face interactions amongst
coworkers and ownership of work space e.g. work station or office. Time is important as
it is equated with loyalty or commitment - in other words , the amount of time spent at
the workplace is equated with commitment and productivity. Understanding the barriers
to distributed work in terms of distance, place and time will provide valuable insights into
incentives and constraints on telecommuting.
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Place
One of the biggest obstacles in rethinking work design is that employees are viewed as
passive objects (i.e. a physical body) in organisations as well as communication and
transport networks. Performing work entails a series of actions in particular situations
undertaken by employees in the pursuit of goals (intended/unintended). Work tasks have
been designed contingent on employees being physically located in particular places at
specific times.
The preoccupation with ‘place’ as a dimension of work design has led to the failure to
exploit the virtual organisation, and consider out-of-work place and out-of-work time.
The idea of the detachment of the ‘person’ from the workplace and the integration of
person within communication networks challenges the traditional notion of
organisational structure and work design.
Distance
Just as distributing work has ‘distance’ connotations so do people’s capacity to distribute
‘themselves’ impinge on this notion. In the case of telecommuting, employees are able to
distribute themselves, by maintaining intimate real-time contact with co-workers and
business associates, through an infrastructure of communication and information
technologies making connections potentially intimate, hence the nature of distance is
changing both in terms of space and time (i.e. turn around time for exchanging messages
is reduced) (Moss 1987 p.536). As time and place have become ‘undistanciated’ this has
implications for work design for management and employees as work depends on social
interaction and cooperation which traditionally has been conceived as ‘proximity’.
Further implications include control (e.g. supervision), introducing change and handling
subsequent resistance, and the capacity of employees to organise industrial disputes.
Does telecommuting allow employees to maintain control? For example, telecommuting
is potentially an anti-hierarchical in that it reconfigures work through the
communication-information infrastructure to be more ‘horizontal’ in nature and less
vertical. Under these conditions, the managerial hierarchy conflates.
Time
Time is a critical issue in designing work. Time is usually conceived as physical in terms
of standardised tasks, work and office hours, deadlines and linked to productivity, output
and loyalty. Time is also equated with a worker’s investment in work such as the number
of hours spent at the workplace. This investment of physical time is then translated into
an emotional investment in the enterprise and equated to a worker’s commitment or
loyalty to the organisation. A significant oversight in work design is that time is also
qualitative in terms of how a worker uses time, regardless of institutional constraints.
The perception of distance, place and time impacts the frequency, mode, timing and
nature of business activities and interactions as well as perceived travel behaviour to
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participate in business activities. Table 1 provides a summary of the work design
dimensions: the top row indicates typical assumptions made about work in terms of time,
place and distance; the left hand column show the conversion of assumptions into
artefacts. The majority of the dimensions impact on both employees and employers
decision making in terms of benefits and constraints that employees and employers face
when evaluating distributed work. All can be translated into a set of evaluative attributes
for the employee and the employer to consider; however the translation into a set of
operational attributes for the choice experiment will place a limit on the number of
attributes and alternatives. We propose to limit the design to 5 attributes (see Table 3)
for each of the employer and the employee and 3 alternatives - two telecommuting
options and current working hours (includes rostered days off and compressed work
weeks).
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Institutional and Managerial Constraints
The relationship between telecommuting and distributed work processes needs to be
understood in terms of restructuring work scheduling options, managerial control, work
support processes, and new organisational forms. Since there has been limited evaluation of
experience with distributed work and telecommuting in work organisations, it is hard to
ascertain the success of such projects (see for example Mokhtarian 1991). However, familiarity
with a successful experience of telecommuting is important for both the employer and
employee in making the choice. Success does depend on how work and organisation is
structured and restructured. The opportunities for distributed work will be determined by both
the benefits and problems perceived by employers and workers,  the way work is structured, the
desire and characteristics of the potential telecommuter, human resource (HR) policies and,
most importantly, the attitude of immediate supervisors. For example, telecommuting may be
constrained if supervisors see little positive effect with absenteeism, turnover, organisational
attachment, job attitudes, off-the-job satisfaction and work-related distress.
The assumed negative impacts of telecommuting include the psychological and professional
deprivation of face-to-face interaction, the need to sustain emotional distinction between work
and home life, the dependence on visibility as recognition for performance and promotion by
management and workers, and union concerns about a virtual workplace. These concerns will
be short-lived if the relationship between distributed work and telecommuting is better
understood. This relationship may lead to a ‘shrinking’ of organisational and inter-
organisational relationships rather than, as is often assumed, distance them. People’s
perceptions and subjective impressions of the organisation, both conventional and virtual in
terms of time, place and distance, are highly significant as to whether telecommuting is
successful or not in specific business contexts.
Organisational Commitment
The introduction of telecommuting can be conceived as a form of organisational change.
Central to processes of organisational change is a reliance by management on employee
commitment, that assumes that employees will respond favourably to changes introduced into
the workplace. A high level of employee responsiveness is essential for the success of a
telecommuting program.  Employees with low levels of skill and autonomy tend to resist
change by subverting the change process ( Clegg and Dunkerley 1980; Cousins 1987).
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Life-Style Issues
Many employees displaced through downsizing are now contracting their services to the public
and private sector, and in some cases, their former employer. Distributed work offers displaced
employees greater flexibility in meeting the demands of multiple projects. Gender and the rise
of two-income and single parent households have emerged as a critical dimension in the
literature on space and time-related constraints on the employment relationship ( McLafferty
and Preston 1991). Depending on their mobility in the labour market and income, women
workers and single parents tend to have shorter commuting distances, more convoluted trip
chains, and rely more heavily on public transport. The location of child care facilities, that is
nearer home or work, is also an important consideration. Both work and travel behaviour may
have higher intra personal variability for this sector of the work force with household and child
and aged care responsibilities. Distributed work may offer more flexible options for this group
combining work, full-time or part-time, with their domestic routine. Distributed work also has
consequences for the family life style, people with disabilities, and the duration of parental
leave. There are also opportunities to combine distributed work and distance learning with
obvious benefits for both the organisation and the individual.
The implications for telecommuting are multi-dimensional in terms of a transport demand
management strategy, institutional and managerial constraints, commitment and life-style
factors. All of these implications have second-order consequences for public policy in
transport, employment and business development. Further management needs to understand
these widespread benefits.
The Focus of the Empirical Inquiry
In promoting these benefits to management, it is important to understand how employer and
employee factors impede or facilitate the choice for telecommuting and subsequent travel
behaviour. Factors determining the choice have, in most cases, been analysed at a qualitative
level but with a growing number of exceptions such as La-Bella et al. (1988), Fischer  et al.
(1990), Bernardino and Ben-Akiva 1996, and the contributions by Mokhtarian and Salomon
(1997). These barriers need to be researched further, particularly their link to potential
increases in productivity and reduction of workforce problems, if the impact of telecommuting
on travel behaviour is to be better understood. Who will commute and why? Who will not and
why? How often will people telecommute? To answer these questions more information and
modeling of managerial and worker choices are required in regard to taking up the options for
distributed work.
Further, there has been very little work on the actual linkage between distributed work and
travel behaviour in terms of accounting for the relationship between an employee and the
managerial hierarchy which lead to a range of incentives and constraints on opportunities to
take up work practices which can aid in more efficient travel patterns from the perspective of
ecologically sustainable development (ESD). The extent to which employers and employees
support these possibilities varies widely . The matching of employer and employee support for a
distributed work policy  is not necessarily strong within the one organisation; and where it does
exist it is often not encouraged by managers throughout the hierarchy. Thus the translation
from corporate policy to telecommuting cannot be assured.
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While there are a growing number of studies (e.g. Mahmassani and Chen 1992, Mahmassani et
al. 1993, Bernardino et al. 1993, Bernardino and Ben-Akiva 1996, ) which have looked at the
role of the employer in influencing the employees opportunities to participate in more flexible
work arrangements in the interests of improving road traffic levels, the focus has been on either
simple workplace rules such as management’s tolerance for lateness or the availability of
flexible working hours. We are unaware of research which has developed a formal conceptual
framework to enable us to analytically model the causal structures between telecommuting,
travel demand, institutional and managerial constraints, commitment and life style factors
that impose limitations for the employee to exercise options in the interests of ESD. It is
important to understand both the sets of constraints and incentives that potentially modify
travel behaviour in the interests of reducing environmental degradation. Figure 1 summarises
some of the key linkages.
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Figure 1: A Schematic Overview of the Major Potential Causal Linkages
Organisational Structure
Labour Relations
Nature of Labour Markets
HR Orientation
Work Organisation
Flexible Work Arrangements
Environmentally Responsible Travel Behaviour
Implications For:
Global Warming (Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Organisational & Institutional
Constraints Employee Commitment
Local Air Pollution (ozone)Levels of Traffic Congestion
(Source: Brewer and Hensher (in press))
Theoretical Framework For Choice Making Under
Distributive Work Regimes
Any situation involving interaction between two or more individuals has elements of
cooperation and non-cooperation. The choice outcome matters to each of them and depends
on the actions of both or all of the players. At the outset of a negotiation, each person
perceives the extent to which the other party will be  cooperative as a commitment to choose a
joint plan of action. This does not imply that either part y sacrifices their interests for the sake
of the other, although it may; only that each communicates and coordinates with a view to
furthering their own unchanged interests by so doin g. The central position here is, that, in  neo-
classical economic terms, ‘private decision-making leading to everyone’s good’ (or agent-
independent utility maximisation ) depends critically on assuming a regime of perfect
competition with numerous participants. In the context of employees and employers thi s is an
unrealistic maintained assumption.
Game theory provides compelling support for the application of a two-person cooperative
game in which the employee and the employer attempt to cooperate (there being nothing to
prevent them from arriving at an outcome as to what each will do). Cooperation assumes
compliance with two tests: (1) for both the employer and the employee it cannot be bettered by
some agreement, and (2) for either the employer or the employee it cannot be bettered by one
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participant going their own way. Importantly, however, whether the employer and employee
will end up acting as a unified agent ( i.e. cooperation), depends on decisions made entirely
non-cooperatively by each party .
There may be lots of outcomes that pass the two tests (known as von Neumann-Morgenstern
solution set of the cooperative game). Nash (1950) solved this problem of indeterminacy
through bargains by recognising that the outcome of a failure to agree (all offers and counter-
offers rejected) is predetermined as the status quo, which are treated here as standard working
hours for the organisation (or some pre-announced outcome if cooperation does not produce a
mutual outcome). In the current context, the status quo can be any paired identical outcome
such as telecommuting 1 day or no telecommuting.
The game-theoretic context is used to study the evolution through negotiation and bargaining
of alternative work practice regimes offered by employers and accepted by employees. The
dynamics of game play is noticeably absent in the literature on stated preference experiments in
general and in the revelation of the choice set and the preferred/chosen alternative spatial and
temporal work practices of employees.
To illustrate how bargaining in a game context works, assume that the alternatives in the trade
are telecommuting 2 days a week, 1 day a week, and non-telecommuting. The employees first
strategy (ee1) is to opt for telecommuting 2 days a week; the second strategy (ee2) is to
telecommute 1 day a week; and the third option (ee 3) is not to telecommute. The employers
strategies (er1, er2 and er3) consist in offering the options in the reciprocal order. If they do not
agree to one of these exchanges, they will remain under current work practice.  The payoffs
might be as given in Table 2. Each cell identifies the payoffs to each agent. For example, in (3 ,-
1), 3 represents the payoff to the employee and -1 is the payoff to the employer. Thus if the
employee chooses to telecommute 1 day a week (ee 2), and the employer chooses not to
telecommute (er1), then the employee receives a payoff of 1.5 and the employer a payoff of 0.5.
Table 2: A Bi-Matrix of Payoffs in an Interactive Telecommuting Preference Game
employer employer employer
er1 er2 er3
employee ee1 (3,-1) (1.5, 0.5) (1.5, 0.5)
employee ee2 (1.5, 0.5) (2.5, 1) (1.5, 0.5)
employee ee3 (1.5, 0.5) (1.5, 0.5) (1,2)
The off-diagonal payoffs show the expected utilities if their demands are not acceded to. It
makes no difference which demand is refused. If they fail to agree the outcome is always the
same - current work practices. The attainable region R in payoff space and the status quo point
(ees, ers) are shown in Figure 2. The negotiations between the employee and the employer are
assumed to be quite frank - all cards on the table. The theory of bargaining games does not say
what we might hear if we witnessed the negotiations - arguments based on inter -temporal
comparisons of utility, or on principles of fairness, appeals to tradition etc. ; but it is clear that
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we would not observe the dissembling manoeuvres typical of real bargaining in which the
employee and employer might begin by exaggerating their true minimum terms, compromising
only if necessary.
The arbitration associated with the bargaining game is defined by Nash (1950) as follows: For
any point (Ua, Ub) in R, consider the quantity (Ua-Sa)(Ub-Sb), the product of the employee
and the employers utility increment from the status quo. Now find ( Ua, Ub) in R that
maximises  this product subject to the constraints that Ua ³ Sa, Ub ³ Sb. This bargaining
solution is in outcome space representing the basket of attributes which are sources of
expected utility. The outcome of cooperative games, the pairs of baskets or attribute mixes,
define the feasible set of distributions in outcome space. The search for the feasible sets can be
implemented through choice experiments. The choice probabilities from the choice experiment
provide the information to construct the expected utility  matrix, an input into interactive
agency utility maximisation .
Figure 2: Telecommuting Preferences
0
1
2
-1
1 2 3
(ee3, er3)
(ee2, er2)
(ee1, er1)
(ees, ers)
von Neumann- Morgenstern
solution set
Uer
Uee
The mapping between payoff and expected utility is not exact. The off-diagonal expected
utilities are likely to be different in each cell and thus the validity of the Nash solution of equal
payoff does not translate into identical expected utilities in the off-diagonal cells.  Indeed the
theory sets out to describe not behaviour but non-cooperative and cooperative modes of
choice. This is why the off-diagonals can be equivalent. In the study of behavioural responses
in preference space this need not be so.  Another way of saying this is that, although the
outcome of non-agreement will always be the same across all non-agreement pairs, the utility
that an agent would have derived from securing a specific outcome if agreement had been
Distributed Work and Travel Behaviour: The Dynamics of Interactive Agency Choices between
Employers and Employees
Brewer & Hensher
14
reached is unlikely to be the same. Our interest is in revealing the expected utility of agency
outcomes and in translating this into a set of cooperative and  non-cooperative probabilities of
paired outcomes for a representative agency pair across a pooled sample of interacting agents.
The sum of the joint probabilities in the three diagonal cells define the cooperative probability
set. The choice probabilities from a discrete choice model  might be as given in Table 3. These
are illustrative and bear no relationship to Table 2. Cooperation is achieved up to a probability
of 0.402, comprising the current outcome (0.0667), telecommuting 1 day a week (0.2324) and
telecommuting 2 days a week (0.1027) .These cooperative probabilities can be identified at
each stage (or pass between the two agents) in the sequential-move interactive agency
experiment  (see the empirical results below).
This solution satisfies Pareto-optimality in that a distribution should not be chosen if there is
another distribution which is feasible and which one player prefers and the other does not
disprefer. If there was an outcome with expected utilities  Ua, Ub, one bigger and one as great
as the payoffs of the Nash solution, then the latter would not maximise  the product of utility
gains, contrary to their definition. It also meets both agents security levels and is known in the
game theory literature as the negotiation (or solution) set (Von Neumann and Morgenstern
1944).
Table 3: A Bi-Matrix of Choice Outcomes in an Interactive Telecommuting Preference 
Game
employer employer employer
er1 er2 er3
employee ee1 (.208,.250) (.208,.583) (.208,.168)
employee ee2 (.375,.250) (.375,.583) (.375,.168)
employee ee3 (.417,.250) (.417,.583) (.417,.168)
The nature of interactive agent choice experiments are now considered. These choice
experiments  will produce a set of expected utilities leading to the determination of cooperative
choice probabilities associated with each mixture of outcomes evaluated by an employer and an
employee. The analysis of each pass in the interactive choice experiment is best represented as
a recursive discrete choice paradigm in which the prior agent’s choice conditions the
subsequent agent’s choice. The recursive structure embodies the employee and the employer
‘flip-flopping’ as the prior and subsequent agent in each round of the ICE. Sequential
estimation of each agent’s choice process at each pass in the sequential negotiation process will
enable us to track the choices made and their revisions up to the point of cooperation or
experiment termination if there is no agreement after a predetermined number of rounds.
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The Empirical Paradigm - Interactive Stated Choice
Experiments
The conceptual framework has identified a set of attributes which have relevance to employees
and employers. The attributes selected for the choice experiments are summarised  in Table 4
together with their levels. They are operational translations of an underlying set of
responsibility criteria (control, communication, good citizenship) which relate to the
dimensions of time, place and distance that affect the work practice decisions of an employer
and an employee. These attributes together with a predefined set of alternatives provide the
empirical context for the set of interactive choice experiments . The universal choice set in this
exploratory phase is assumed to be three alternatives - current work practices (e.g. 9am-5pm at
the employer’s location - CURR), and telecommuting (TC1 or TC2). In the current study we
concentrate on the choices of an employee and an employer, exogenising the constraints
imposed on an employee by the household. In ongoing research we introduce the endogenous
link between the employee and other household members activity choices which impact on the
employees work practices.
Table 4: Description of Choice Dimensions, Attributes and Question Items and 
Responses
Choice Dimensions Description Participant Questions Response Set
People contact (CONTACT) contact with people
(internal and external)
necessary to perform work
If I telecommute the
level of contact
necessary with other
people for my work
would be ….
1. lower
2. unchanged
3. higher
Control over job (CONTROL) power over work
process(es)
If I telecommute the
amount of control I
have over my work
would be ….
1.    lower
2.    unchanged
3.    higher
Productivity/effort (PROD) amount of effort in relation
to work output
If I telecommute, my
productivity will be….
1. lower
2. unchanged
        higher
Information (INFO) access to information
necessary to perform work
If I telecommute access
to information
necessary for my job
would be …
1. location-dependent
2. limited away from
workplace
3. location-
independent
Career (CAREER) perceived prospects of
promotion threatened by
telecommuting
If I telecommute, my
career prospects  will
be..
4. lower
5. unchanged
6. higher
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Four sequential interactive choice experiments have been administered to a sample of
employees and their employers using a randomised ordering of a series of showcards. In Round
1, the employee is first selected and interviewed in respect of a predefined set of distributed
work opportunities including the null alternative  of current work practice at a central location.
The employee completes the first round of the choice experiment involving the evaluation of a
number of alternative distributed work scenarios, which is repeated three times. In Round 2,
the immediate supervisor (as the employer’s representative) is  asked to make an offer to the
employee i n the context of the same choice experiment but under two information scenarios -
with and without knowledge of the employees preferred choice on each of three replications.
The employee is also asked to identify an  initial set of potential household constraints which
influence the  ‘preferred’ offer to the employer.
Round 3: a set of first round supervisor responses are fed back to the employee who assesses
the ‘preferred offer(s)’ of the supervisor and then repeats the same experiment  as in Round 1,
revising or staying with their preferred first round offer. Reasons for maintaining or revising
Round 1 preferences are identified. In Round 4, the outcome is then fed back to the supervisor
who re-evaluates his position in the face of the employees second-round response (this time in
full knowledge  of the employee’s, original or revised, preferred response). The supervisor is
now supplied with the employees first and second round ‘preferred’ offers. For each of the
three replications, the supervisor then makes a further offer which may maintain the first round
offer or lead to a revision. Reasons are sought for maintenance or revision of round 1
preferences. If the offer from the supervisor is accepted, that is the end of the process - a
cooperative solution has been produced. If s/he rejects the offer, a stalemate is the outcome.
The experiment does not extend into the negotiation space of a new option set. The sequential
negotiation structure is shown pictorially in Table 6 (below). The initial set of experiments are
sequential. Simultaneous interactions are investigated in ongoing research where the employer
and the employee are exposed to the full set of options being evaluated by both parties (with
the same offer and counter-offer structure as the sequential approach).
Once the final round is complete, the supervisor and employee are interviewed separately to
elicit information on the following  contextual variables:  significance of attribute in making
choice, gender, employment status, position in organisational  hierarchy, nature of employment
and work responsibilities, work tenure, access to telecommunications, perceived significance of
work to the organisation, perceived visible impact of work to the organisation, perception of
management’s view of work ‘absence’ during telecommuting, extent to which work requires
close interaction with co-workers, supervisors, clients, nature of current trip to and from work
e.g. multi- or single-trip, estimated change in daily vehicle kilometres by mode on TC day(s),
perceived benefits and constraints on telecommuting, HRM Policy: employee-friendly,
household constraints and organisational  style.
The interactive agency choice experiment is designed as a switching design where the base is
the current work practices of each sampled employee. The two switching alternatives are
telecommuting  for 1 day a week (TC1) and telecommuting  for 2 days a week (TC2). Each
option is defined by 5 attributes each at three levels. The design has 10 attributes of the order
310. A fraction of 27 profiles is derived from the full factorial. The 27 profiles are a main effects
plan with 2 residual degrees of freedom with one uncorrelated two-way interaction permitted.
The design is perfectly orthogonal. Each employee and employer will be given 3 randomised
profiles from the 27 profile set and will be randomised to ensure that each profile occurs an
Distributed Work and Travel Behaviour: The Dynamics of Interactive Agency Choices between
Employers and Employees
Brewer & Hensher
17
equal number of times across the sample. Since estimation will be at the sample level (and not
an individual level) this strategy is acceptable.
Empirical Analysis And Results
To implement the game theoretic interactive agency problem , a small convenience sample of
three large, transport-related, organisations was initially selected, yielding 20 employee-
employer pairs. Additional interviews are being undertaken on a progressive basis as part of an
ongoing study of telecommuting, and will be added to the sample over time. In each instance,
the chief executive officer (CEO) and the Human Resource (HR) manager was contacted by
letter outlining the rationale and method of the study. The letter of introduction was followed
by a phone call to arrange a face-to-face meeting to set up interviews with up to 10 pairs of
supervisor-employee in each organisation. Appointments were made with each pair on the
same day to facilitate the interaction process.  The data is sufficiently detailed in content and
sample size (after expanding out the 20 pairs of employee-employer to 60 observations in
round 1 and round 2) to enable preliminary analysis of the interactive choice experiments for
two passes of the interaction between employee and employer. A pass is defined as a sequence
of employee and employer offers. Pass 1 involves round 1 and round 2; pass 2 involves round 3
employee review given round 2 employer response. If there was agreement in pass 1 on a
replication of the three ICE’s then the experiment finishes for that replication.
The five design attributes in Table 4 - contact, control, productivity, information and career -
are the main items of interest; however their role in the employee’s and employer’s processing
of the alternatives will be conditioned by characteristics of the individual such as gender, the
position held in the organisation, years employed by the organisation and nature of work
undertaken. The nature of work takes on many dimensions which we have captured on  a
Likert scale through notions of variety, autonomy, task identity, feedback, interaction, location
dependence and role ambiguity.
A summary of the key descriptive statistics is given in Table 5. In addition to the ICE attributes
and selective personal characteristics, the survey obtained data on the employee and
employer’s views on job scope, work scheduling flexibility, pace of work, ability to partition an
employee’s activities and to identify contribution, feedback mechanisms for identifying
performance, extent of interaction required in work activity, clarity of expectation of level of
performance, perception of the family-friendliness of the organisation, and support mechanisms
in the organisation to avoid stress. All of these qualitative dimensions of work practices and
responses are potentially important influences on the support given by the employee and the
employer to telecommuting and enable us, through model estimation, to establish an
understanding of the potential constraints imposed by employers and employees in preventing
cooperation on telecommuting. Each dimension is defined in the notes to Table 5 and evaluated
in the choice models in the next section.
Table 6 summarises the distribution of pairs of alternatives selected at each pass in the
negotiation between the employee and the employer, grouping them in terms of agreement and
non-agreement. There are 9 possible paired outcomes, three of which define agreement (e.g.
eetc1- ertc1). The role of knowledge of what the employee prefers has a very marked effect on
the findings. 21 of the 27 experiments resulted in pass 1 agreement in the presence of the
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employer’s knowledge of the employee’s offer; in contrast only 15 of the 33 experiments
resulted in agreement in pass 1 in the absence of such knowledge. Furthermore, the agreement
was not limited to the status quo outcome of non-telecommuting, which is encouraging,
suggesting that employers are amenable to supporting telecommuting under the appropriate
conditions as proposed in the attribute mixes offered in the ICE. The role of each attribute will
be evaluated below through a set of recursive discrete choice models. For Pass 2 onwards,
both parties have knowledge of each other’s offers. The sample size is too small for pass 3 and
4, but, with reservation, one might interpret Pass 2 as demonstrating the willingness to
negotiate and trade offers to arrive at a cooperative outcome. This is best highlighted by the
column of ‘no knowledge (pass 1)’ participants; in Pass 2 the employees have revised their
offers in the light of the employer’s offer, producing 13 out of 18 agreements. The formal
modeling below seeks to identify the influences on agreement/non-agreement in each pass as
well as the influences on choice of telecommuting 1 day a week, 2 days a week or maintaining
the current non-telecommuting option.
Table 5: Summary Descriptors for Passes 1 and 2
ER (NO. OF CASES = 60) EE (NO. OF CASES = 60) COMBINED
Acronym Definition MEAN STD DEV MEAN STD DEV MEAN STD DEV
PASS 1 ee1 and er1
CONTACT see Table 4 1.083 0.696 1.017 0.676 1.050 0.684
CONTROL see Table 4 1.133 0.596 1.167 0.668 1.150 0.630
PRODUCT see Table 4 1.217 0.613 1.217 0.613 1.217 0.611
INFO see Table 4 0.933 0.634 0.817 0.701 0.875 0.668
CAREER see Table 4 1.083 0.696 1.200 0.659 1.142 0.677
EMPLOY Years employee  in organisation 5.400 3.492 5.775 4.623 5.588 4.084
GENDER male (1), female (2) 1.250 0.437 1.850 0.360 1.550 0.500
JS see definition below 81.000 8.068 79.800 5.710 80.400 6.985
AUTOVAR1 sum of 3.1-3.8 below 30.750 3.373 30.900 2.628 30.825 3.012
TIDENT1 3.9 below 3.500 0.748 3.000 0.713 3.250 0.770
FEED2 sum of 3.10 and 3.11 below 9.100 1.349 8.250 1.622 8.675 1.546
INTER1 sum of 3.12 and 3.13 below 6.900 1.231 6.750 0.704 6.825 1.001
ROLEA3 sum of 4.1 to 4.6 below 23.950 2.734 24.150 3.394 24.050 3.070
FAMILY4 6.4 below 3.300 1.319 3.600 1.123 3.450 1.229
VIEW4 6.5 below 3.900 1.349 3.100 1.623 3.500 1.539
PASS 2 er1 and ee2
CONTACT see Table 4 1.208 0.779 1.042 0.806 1.125 0.789
CONTROL see Table 4 1.042 0.624 1.000 0.780 1.021 0.699
PRODUCT see Table 4 1.042 0.690 1.042 0.690 1.042 0.683
INFO see Table 4 1.083 0.584 1.083 0.717 1.083 0.647
CAREER see Table 4 0.958 0.806 1.083 0.881 1.021 0.838
EMPLOY Years employee  in organisation 6.667 3.547 7.063 4.600 6.865 4.068
GENDER male (1), female (2) 1.333 0.482 1.792 0.415 1.563 0.501
JS see definition below 81.167 8.499 80.167 5.647 80.667 7.156
AUTOVAR1 sum of 3.1-3.8 below 30.458 3.611 30.917 2.653 30.688 3.143
TIDENT1 3.9 below 3.458 0.658 2.708 0.690 3.083 0.767
FEED2 sum of 3.10 and 3.11 below 9.583 0.830 8.792 1.062 9.188 1.024
INTER1 sum of 3.12 and 3.13 below 7.208 1.103 6.833 0.637 7.021 0.911
ROLEA3 sum of 4.1 to 4.6 below 24.250 1.894 24.292 2.612 24.271 2.257
FAMILY4 6.4 below 3.417 1.316 3.500 1.216 3.458 1.254
VIEW4 6.5 below 4.250 1.152 3.500 1.588 3.875 1.424
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Notes to Table 5:
JS (job scope) = 2*AUTOVAR + TIDENT + FEED Job Scope (JS) (Based on Stone 1976) is a 13 item inventory measuring responses on a 5
point continuum, scored 1 to 5 and combined to yield a weighted measure of JS
AUTOVAR: The extent to which employees have a major say in scheduling their work, selecting the equipment they use, the pace at which they
work as well as the degree to which work requires employees to perform a wide range of processes
TIDENT: the extent to which employees perform an entire or whole piece of work and can clearly identify the results of their efforts
FEEDBACK: the degree to which employees receive information as they are working which reveals how well they are performing on the job
INTER: the degree to which the employee's work requires them to interact with other people (internal and external) to the workplace
ROLEA - Role Ambiguity (based on Caplan and Jones 1975): the extent to which employees do not know what is expected of them for the
adequate performance of their role or work. Items scored 1 to 5 respectively
FAMILY: the extent to which employees and employers regard their organisation as a `family friendly’ one, scored 1, 3 and 5 respectively
VIEW: the extent to which the employee perceives that the supervisor supports the view that `working late is undesirable because eventually you
will experience strain in normal working hours' ,  scored 1, 3 and 5 respectively
1 = 1-5 scale: never, rarely, sometimes, often, always; 2 = 1-3 scale: very little, a moderate amount, very much; 3 = 1-5 scale: very little of time,
little of the time, some of the time, very often, almost all of the time; 4=1-3 scale: very little, a moderate amount, very much
Likert items (same questions to employee and employer; employer wording listed below):
3.1  How often is employee X able to choose the methods used to do his or her work?
3.2  How frequently is employee X able to choose the order of things to be done to complete his or her work?
3.3  How often is employee X able to choose the speed at which he or she works?
3.4  How often does employee X alone do everything that is required to produce an entire product or provide an entire service?
3.5  How much is employee X left on their own to do his or her own work?
3.6  How often does employee X see projects or jobs through to completion?
3.7  How frequently are you able to tell from your own observations how well employee X is doing his or her work (in terms of quantity and
quality)?
3.8  To what extent does employee X’s work rely on others (individually or as a group) to produce a given amount of work?
3.9  How often do you give employee X information about how well he or she is doing in their work (in terms of quality and quantity)?
3.10  To what extent is dealing with other people a part of employee X’s job?
3.11  To what extent is employee X able to act independently of his/her supervisor (you) in performing his or her job function?
3.12  How often is employee X required to talk to other workers, supervisors or customers about work-related matters while at work?
3.13  How frequently does employee X talk to other workers, supervisors or customers about non-work matters while at work?
4.1  I am confident that employee X knows how much authority he/she has
4.2  Clear, planned goals and objectives exist for employee X’s job
4.3  I know employee X has divided his or her time properly
4.4  Employee X knows what his or her responsibilities are
4.5  Employee X knows exactly what is expected of him or her
4.6  Employee X receives clear explanation of what is to be done.
6.4  To what extent would you regard your organisation as ‘family-friendly’?
6.5  To what extent would you support the following view that ‘ working late is undesirable because eventually strain will be experienced in
normal working hours’?
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Table 6: Profile of Negotiation in the ICE
With Knowledge
No of pairs = 9
No of experiments = 27
Without Knowledge (pass 1)
No of pairs = 11
No of experiments = 33
Agree Not Agree Agree Not Agree
EE1            ER1 EE1            ER1
          PASS 1 Current 10 Current - TC1 - Current 2 Current - TC1 3
TC1 7 Current - TC2 - TC1 5 Current - TC2 1
EE1                 ER1 TC2 4 TC1 - Current - TC2 8 TC1 - Current 1
TC1 - TC2 - TC1 - TC2 6
TC2 - Current 2 TC2 - Current 1
TC2 - TC1 4 TC2 - TC1 6
ER1            EE2 ER1            EE2
         PASS 2 Current - Current - TC1 1 Current 2 Current - TC1 -
TC1 3 Current - TC2 1 TC1 4 Current - TC2 -
ER1                 EE2 TC2 - TC1 - Current - TC2 7 TC1 - Current 1
TC1 - TC2 1 TC1 - TC2 4
TC2 - Current - TC2 - Current -
TC2 - TC1 - TC2 - TC1 -
EE2           ER2 EE2           ER2
           PASS 3 Current - Current - TC1 - Current 1 Current - TC1 -
TC1 - Current - TC2 - TC1 - Current - TC2 -
EE2              ER2 TC2 1 TC1 - Current - TC2 1 TC1 - Current -
TC1 - TC2 1 TC1 - TC2 -
TC2 - Current 1 TC2 - Current -
TC2 - TC1 - TC2 - TC1 3
ER2            EE3 ER2            EE3
        PASS 4 Current - Current - TC1 - Current - Current - TC1 -
TC1 - Current - TC2 1 TC1 1 Current - TC2 -
ER2             EE3 TC2 1 TC1 - Current - TC2 - TC1 - Current -
TC1 - TC2 - TC1 - TC2 2
TC2 - Current - TC2 - Current -
TC2 - TC1 - TC2 - TC1 -
Interactive Choice Experiment Findings
A series of choice models were estimated to evaluate potential influences on the employee’s
and the employer’s preference for the status quo (CURR), TC1 and TC2. In addition to the
design attributes, we are interested in the role of contextual variables describing the employee
and the employer, as well as structural influences on the execution of the interactive choice
experiment (ICE). The estimation procedure is recursive multinomial logit with the Murphy-
Type l correction for the asymptotic standard errors. The following steps are implemented:
· Step 1 (ee1) : First sequential move offer of employee - 3 replications per employee. As the
first experiment there is no involvement of the employer.
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· Step 2 (er1): First sequential move offer of employer - the same 3 replications as per the
employee. The knowledge of the employee’s offer is revealed to half of the employers only.
We include a variable representing the actual offer from the employee for the subset who
are informed of the employee’s choice. If the employee and employer agree on the offer in
pass 1 for a replication, then that concludes the ICE for the agency pair. This state of
negotiation is identified by a ‘pass agreement’ dummy variable (=1 if agree and 0
otherwise). An important hypothesis is that the agents are more likely to agree where the
employer has knowledge of the employee’s preferred offer, and where the offer of both
parties is to stay with the current situation. We also expect that the agreement of agents in
an earlier pass will arise when the status quo offer is preferred; and that the agreement on
the status quo will weaken through the pass negotiations, increasing the probability that a
telecommuting offer is more likely. If this is true, then we have identified the limiting value
of an empirical strategy which fails to reveal the views of both parties in negotiation,
denying the opportunity to relax constraints to telecommuting.
· Step 3 (ee1, er1): Evaluate the influences on the pass agreement (1,0) outcome for the first
sequential move offers. These influences include design attributes, individual characteristics
and the individual’s perception of the opportunities and constraints associated with
telecommuting and the status quo.
· Step 4  (ee1, er1): Calculate the expected utility matrix for the employee and the employer
and identify the cooperation probability for each alternative.  The non-cooperation
probabilities for each off-diagonal pair of alternatives are also identified.
· Step 5 (ee2 |er1): Second sequential move of the employee given the employer’s offer in pass
1, for situations of non-agreement in round 1. For Step 5 and beyond, all employees have
knowledge of the employer’s preferred offer. We evaluate the employee’s offer which may
or may not be revised from pass 1, in the light of knowledge of the employer’s preferred
offer (which is different to that of the employee in pass 1). We include a variable
representing the actual offer from the employer in the previous round (er 1).
· Step 6(ee2|er1): Evaluate the influences on the pass agreement (1,0) outcome for the second
sequential move offers, following the approach in Step 3.
· Step 7 (er1): Re-estimate pass 1 employer model for the subset of employer’s who continue
into Pass 2.
· Step 8 (er1|ee2): Evaluate the influences on the pass agreement (1,0) outcome for the second
sequential move offers, following the approach in Step 3.
· Step 9 (er1, ee2): Calculate the expected utility matrix for the employee and the employer
and identify the cooperation probability for each alternative in pass 2.
· Repeat Steps 5 to 9 for pass 3
· Repeat Steps 5 to 9 for pass 4.
The process continues subject to the number of steps required to achieve a cooperative
outcome and the limits on sample size for model estimation. Table 7 summarises the changes in
stated choice patterns for employees from Pass 1 to Pass 2. The most interesting finding is that
employees who did not make an initial offer which was in agreement and who initially preferred
telecommuting have exercised their continuing preference for telecommuting through revising
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6 (25%)
their offer to the other telecommuting alternative and hardly to the status quo. This may be a
strategy to send a signal to the employer that negotiation exists but that some form of
telecommuting is strongly preferred. This strategy appears to be symmetrical between TC 1 to
TC2 and TC2 to TC1. In ongoing research we are investigating the profile of employees and
constraints they impose on themselves within each pair of pass 1-Pass 2 offers.
Table 7: Stated Choice Patterns for Employees who continue to Pass 2
No of observations = 24
Pass 1 Pass 2
EE1 EE2
Current Current
TC1 TC1
TC2 TC2
The results for each step are presented in Tables 8 and 9. Table 8 summarises the results for
the ICE experiment choice set. The five design attributes representing Contact, Control,
Productivity, and Career prospects have been entered linearly into the indirect utility
expressions for TC1 and TC2 at this exploratory stage. Information by its definition is difficult
to support in this functional form and has been input as K-1 dummy variables . Each attribute
associated with TC1 and TC2 has three ordered levels with the middle level being equivalent to
the level currently applying to an employee. The current alternative is defined by unchanged
attribute levels, essentially a base alternative.
0 (0 %)
6 (25%)
2 (8%)
1 (4%)
1 (4%)
1 (4%)
6 (25%)
1 (4%)
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Table 9 summarises the findings for the binary choice pass agreement models. In addition to
the parameter estimates, we provide the marginal effects defined as the derivatives of the
probabilities, that is djm =  ¶Pj /¶xm  =  [1(j=m)-PjPm]b. The marginal effects have substantive
behavioural meaning; the parameter estimates do not.  A close inspection of the marginal effects will
identify the influence that a 1 unit change in an attribute has on the probability of selecting a
particular alternative, ceteris paribus. Three distributed work choice models have been estimated,
two employee models for passes 1 and 2, and an employer model for pass 1. The pass 2 employer
model is identical in form to the pass 1 model, and only estimated to identify the relevant
cooperative probabilities for the employers carried forward into Pass 2 who did no reach agreement
with their employee in pass 1. All three models identify a number of statistically significant
influences on choice, which add to the overall goodness-of-fit in a substantial way. In contrast, the
alternative-specific constants play a small role in the presence of explicit attributes.
Table 8: The Offer Models for Each Pass
(t-values in parenthesis) [marginal effects in brackets]
Note: The marginal effects are reported for each of the alternatives in the order CURR, TC 1 and TC2.  They sum to zero across
the choice set. We have excluded the marginal effects for INFO since it is a (1,0) dummy variable and not meaningful as
an effect at the margin
Attribute (see Table 5 for
definitions)
Alternative Pass 1 ee1 Pass 1 er1 Pass 2 ee2
constant CURR 33.540  (3.36) -6.680 (-1.67) 20.423 (1.96)
constant TC1 28.46  (3.09) -9.864 (-2.51) 23.55 (1.94)
CONTACT TC1 -.03177 (-.11) [.21,-.46,.25] .1034 (.29)[-.43,-.79,1.2] -2.292 (-1.98)
[4.8,-21.3,16.6]
CONTACT TC2 -.03177 (-.11) [..19,.25,-.44] .1034 (.29) [-.43,-.79,1.2] -2.292 (-1.98) [5.5,16.6,-22.0]
CONTROL TC1 .4229 (1.23) [-2.8,6.2,-3.4] .5289 (1.34) [-2.6,6.6,-4.0] -.4524 (-.60) [.94,-4.2,3.3]
CONTROL TC2 .4229 (1.23)  [2.6,-3.4,5.9] .5289 (1.34) [-2.2,-4.0,6.2] -.4524 (-.60) [1.1,3.3,-4.3]
PROD TC1 1.5062 (3.42) [-9.9,21.9,-11.9] .7573 (2.02)[-3.7,9.5,-5.6] -.2381 (-.29) [.50,-2.2,1.7]
PROD TC2 1.5062  (3.42) [-9.1,-11.9,21.1] .7573 (2.02)[-3.1,-5.8,8.9] -.2381 (-.29) [.57,1.7,-2.3]
INFO low TC1,TC2 1.3349 (2.10) -.187 (-.28) -2.099 (-1.3)
INFO medium TC1,TC2 .0384 (.06) .8654 (1.27) -2.326 (-1.34)
CAREER TC1 .6115 (1.92) [-4.1,8.9,-4.9] .4220 (1.29)[-2.08,5.3,-3.2] -1.491 (-1.32)[3.1,-13.9,10.8]
CAREER TC2 .6115 (1.92) [-3.7,-4.9,8.5] .4220 (1.29)[-1.74,-3.2,4.9] -1.491 (-1.32)[3.6,10.8,-14.3]
VIEW CURR -.8434 (-2.94)[-10.6, 5.5,5.04] - -1.323 (-1.41)[-5.9,2.76,3.15]
Years employed by orgn TC2 .2893 (2.85) [-1.7,-2.3,4.0] - -
AUTOVAR TC2 .2754 (1.77) [-1.7,-2.2,3.8] - -
TIDENT TC2 2.010 (2.85) - -
INTER TC2 1.20  (1.74) [-6.2,-8.1,14.3] -1.487 (-2.52)[6.1,11,-17.4] -
ROLEA TC2 .2257 (1.96)
[-1.4,-1.8,3.2]
- 1.336  (2.08)
[-2.2,-2.7,4.9]
With (1), Without knowledge (0) CURR n/a 4.230  (3.60)
[38.3,-20.9,-17.4]
-
FAMILY CURR - -.9781 (-2.50)
[-8.86,4.8,4.0]
-
Agent choice in previous pass TC1 n/a n/a -
Agent choice in previous pass TC2 n/a n/a -
Choice of prior agent in current
pass
TC1 n/a 14.465  (.09) [ns ] 2.8287  (2.00) [-5.9,26.3,-20.4]
Choice of prior agent in current
pass
TC2 n/a -1.4867 (-2.52)[-10.5,-
19,29]
2.8288  (2.00) [-6.7,-20.4,27.2]
No. of observations 60 60 24
Log-Likelihood (b) at convergence -41.91 -33.72 -9.57
Pseudo-R2  constants to
convergence
.268 .417 .461
Pseudo-R2  no parameters to
convergence
.280 .426 .529
Contribution of constants .014 .09 .068
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Table 9 Sources of Influence on Co-operative Outcomes in Each Pass
(t-values in parenthesis)
Attribute Pass 1 er1 Pass 2 ee2
constant 5.493  (2.45) 33.040 (3.00)
FAMILY -.1665 (-1.36) [-.03971] -
VIEW -.4519 (-3.22) [-.1078] -
JS -.03707 (-1.53) [-.00884] -
MALE - -8.877 (-3.22) [-1.130]
AUTOVAR - -1.558 (-3.59) [-.1984]
TIDENT - -.8589 (-1.31) [-.1094]
INTER - 3.81  (1.82) [.3922]
No. of observations 180 72
Percent who agree 60.0 66.8
Prediction success
(allocated on max probability)
66.6 83.3%
Pseudo-r2 .08 .49
Log-Likelihood (b) -115.09 -23.52
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
Pass 1 Employee Choice
The design attributes reflect the underlying dimensions of time, place and distance proposed
in the conceptual framework. ‘Distance’ had the largest impact on telecommuting.
Productivity, information (segmented as location-dependent and otherwise), and career all
have a statistically significant positive effect on telecommuting. When personal productivity is
higher as a consequence of telecommuting, the probability of an employee choosing to
telecommute increases markedly, as shown by the magnitude of the positive marginal effect.
The productivity effect is the most influential factor being used by employees to support
telecommuting. Thus if evidence can be accumulated to support this situation, then it offers an
attractive incentive to employers to support telecommuting.
Where information is location-dependent ( INFOlow), the probability of telecommuting
increases relative to contexts where information to perform one’s job is limited away from the
workplace, or where information needed is location independent. This finding can be
interpreted in one of two ways: either that when working at home, employees would have
access to information necessary for work performance, or information access could be easily
transferable from office to home. This finding suggests that when information is confined to the
work location it is more compatible with telecommuting.
The choice model suggests that career prospects would be higher if employees telecommuted.
This finding suggests that perceived career prospects by the employee is not tied to visibility in
the workplace as previously suggested in the literature. It may be that those who have high
personal productivity see career prospects paralleling this, or that they see career future
prospects tied to increasing workplace flexibility such as telecommuting.
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The amount of interaction with people (CONTACT), either customers or co-workers, had no
statistical effect on telecommuting nor did the amount of perceived control over one’s work
(CONTROL). These findings are interesting in that both are perceived in the literature as
potential constraints on telecommuting. In other words regardless of how interactive a person’s
job is or the extent of control, they do not see this as affecting the capacity to telecommute or
not.
Several other variables influenced the choice to telecommute in pass 1. Where employees had
high autonomy (i.e. ability to choose work methods, schedules, pace and instruments) and
variety (i.e. non-routine work and location, variable instruments and speed) at work as
represented by AUTOVAR, the probability of telecommuting 2 days per week increases,
although the marginal effect is not strong. Frequency of interaction about work- or non-work-
related matters (INTER) was also a significant influence on the choice to telecommute 2 days
per week by employees. Employees may no longer perceive highly interactive work to be
incompatible with telecommuting due to the enhancement of telecommunications and
information technologies. These new technologies allow employees to transform their work
stations into their home office, and interact with co-workers, supervisors and customers who
are often unaware that the employee is not in their office. The drive to negotiate harder is
emanating from the flexibility that employees perceive in their work which is initially
constrained by the employer. This finding is crucial to understanding the limits on the
implementation of telecommuting programs in organisations. Employees may have a greater
understanding of the work they perform and its compatibility with telecommuting whereas
employers may be basing their decisions on ‘traditional’ work design assumptions.
The more likely employees know what is expected of them in terms of either work
performance or demands (ROLEA), the more likely they will choose to telecommute 2 days
per week. Where employees identified highly with their work (TIDENT), the higher is the
probability that they choose telecommuting 2 days per week. The longer the employee’s tenure
with the employing organisation, the more likely that they will choose to telecommute 2 days
per week. This last finding may be related to career (design attribute) in that the tenure and
career prospects might be perceived as linked by the employee.
Pass 1 Employer Choice
In the first round, 45 per cent of employers made a choice with knowledge of employee’s
preference. In the ‘with knowledge’ condition, where the employer is aware of the employees
offer, the probability of the employer preferring the status quo increases significantly. The
marginal effect is also strong. This is an important finding suggesting a much more
conservative and constraining response by the employer when the employee’s choice is known.
This interpretation is reinforced by the evidence in Table 6 that only 10 of the 27 employee
offers in pass 1 were the maintenance of the current situation. This finding demonstrates a
potentially fundamental disunity in the employment relationship between employer and
employee. Although this inconsistency exists, there is greater consistency between employers
and employees in the model attributes. Similar to the employee model, both productivity and
location-dependent information have a positive influence on telecommuting, although career
does not. In other words, when the employer sees that the employee is highly productive (or
motivated) and information can be transferred to the home location, these diminish as a
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constraint on telecommuting. Unlike the employee model, career is not significant for the
employer counterpart. Intuitively, this finding makes sense. As organisations distribute work, it
is more difficult for the employer to provide a ‘traditional’ career path for employees.
There is very strong evidence that the employer is not supportive of extensive telecommuting
(i.e. 2 days a week) where the employee’s work requires interaction with people internal and
external to the workplace (INTER). The marginal effects are sizeable. The employer who
perceives their organisation of relatively more family-friendly has a higher probability of
supporting telecommuting. This is an important finding with a strong marginal effect,
highlighting the building of trust as an important element of a successful telecommuting
program.
Pass 1 Sources of Influence on Agreement and Non-Agreement
Where job scope (JS - high variety, autonomy, feedback, task identity, interaction) is high for
employee, the employer and employee are less likely to agree in Pass 1 (Table 9). Two
motivators appear to be driving employees to negotiate harder. The first one is when they
perceive their current employer to be a ‘family-friendly’ one (FAMILY). Shifts in social
demographics have already made ‘family-friendly’ a significant dimension of human resource
management. As a response toward the ‘family-friendly’ trend, many employees may be
tempted to push the employer into introducing a telecommuting program to address child care
and life style needs. The second motivator is when employees perceive that the employer views
that ‘working late is undesirable due to eventual strain’ (VIEW). The employee may feel that
telecommuting is a strategy to minimise late working hours. These three influences provide the
basis for further inquiry into what constraints the organisation might review and change if they
are supportive of telecommuting; however it must be recognised that the agreement model
aggregates all three cooperation pairs (CURR-CURR, TC1-TC1 and TC2-TC2); as the
accumulated sample of agency pairs increases we will be able to distinguish between the
agreement pairs and unravel the particular constraints associated with agreements which
promote the status quo. A contribution to this unravelling can be made in subsequent passes as
we seek out the factors which have exerted some influence on further agreement after 1 round
of non-cooperation. In the current paper, sample size limits this opportunity, even though the
approach we have proposed is capable of revealing these influences.
Pass 2 Employee Choice
In Pass 2, all design attributes are negative and create less of an impact (see Table 8),
suggesting the nature of the decision making process has altered. With the exception on
CONTACT, the design attributes are not statistically significant. The higher the amount of
contact necessary with other people as part of work tends, ceteris paribus, to increase the
probability an employee choosing to telecommute. The marginal effect is quite noticeable, and
begs the question about the behavioural plausibility of a negative effect. As suggested above,
the whole issue of contact being ‘optimised’ through centralisation of work in one place may
be false, given the changing nature of the medium available to communicate. The current study
is revealing this potential claim throughout all stages of the ICE as well as in the likert-scale
dimensions.
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The reduced number of observations after pass 1 (from 60 to 24), and the reduced role of the
design attributes in negotiating offer positions, suggests that other factors are now playing a
more important role in positioning the negotiations. The design attributes may have performed
their most important role in pass 1. One might expect that with  a larger sample that their effect
dissipates as we move to more passes. If true, this is an important finding, suggesting that
attributes influence the negotiations at different stages in some hierarchical fashion in
accordance with the current state of negotiations. Our ongoing research will enable us to focus
on this possibility; which if true raises fundamental concerns about a strictly ‘cross-sectional’
approach to studying interactive choice behaviour.
What is more important in Pass 2 is the impact of the manager’s decision on the employee
(‘choice of prior agent in current pass’ - see Table 8). Ceteris paribus, where an employer in
pass 1 has chosen to support a telecommuting option, the probability of an employee choosing
to telecommute is higher. The marginal effect is very strong , suggesting that there is potential
to establish a context for telecommuting when the employer is seen to be very supportive. An
interesting implication is that in the earlier pass (pass 1), the employee may have been
‘rejecting’ telecommuting in anticipation of no support from the employer; yet when it is
known that there is employer support, the employees true revealed option is exercised through
Pass 2 revision. If true, then seeking out the reasons why the employer is willing to support
telecommuting as a major constraint on the employees willingness to express a desire to
telecommute is a priority research question.
Role ambiguity is important in employee  2 choosing TC2 (ROLEA). The more likely
employees know what is expected of them in terms of either work performance or demands,
the more likely they will choose to telecommute 2 days per week.
Pass 2 Sources of Influence on Agreement and Non-Agreement
Four factors were identified as influences on the probability of agreeing in Pass 2. Male
employees tend, ceteris paribus, to have a lower probability of agreeing than females; high
work autonomy and variety (AUTOVAR) and task identity (TIDENT) also reduce agreement
between employer and employee. This finding is consistent with the notion that the greater
personal control employees experience at work the less compliant people will be. Finally,
higher interaction between people internal and external to the workplace increases the
probability of agreement. The specific linkage may be an artefact of the perception of real
choices which narrows the negotiation space and thus leads to an early agreement. We cannot
be sure this is valid since INTER was not significant in pass 1; however it is a component of JS
in pass 1, which also had a positive parameter. This brief discussion of the agreement model in
Pass 2 together with the results for pass 1 suggests the need for a decomposition of agreement
into the three cooperation pairs. Unfortunately sample size in the current study did not allow
this. As we accumulate more data on agency pairs we will be able to investigate this matter.
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Establishing Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Probabilities
The distribution of cooperative and non-cooperative choice probabilities for all nine agency
choice pairs is given in Table 10 for pass 1 and Pass 2. As might be expected the cooperation
occurs up to a probability which is higher as we progress from pass 1 to Pass 2. In particular,
we have found that, for the current sample,  the probability of cooperating in pass 1 is 0.4518,
and 0.5714 in Pass 2. Most pleasing is a recognition that the cooperative probability for a
telecommuting outcome is .3343 in pass 1 and .5235 in Pass 2. The increase within the
telecommuting offers increases at a higher rate than the overall probability of cooperation, as
employees and employers negotiate and gain knowledge of the underlying views of each party
as revealed through the design attributes and covariates.  The findings in Table 10 replace the
illustrative estimates in Table 3.
Table 10: Distribution of Co-operative Probabilities in Each Pass - Sample Means
(each column sums to 1.0)
Employee-Employer Pair Pass 1:
ee1 to er1
Pass 2:
er1 to ee2
Current-Current .1175 .0479
TC1 - TC1 .1572 .2656
TC2 - TC2 .1771 .2579
Total Coop Prob .4518 .5714
Current - TC1 .0983 .0716
Current - TC2 .0509 .0056
TC1 - Current .0708 .0395
TC1 - TC2 .0886 .0282
TC2 - Current .0784 .0793
TC2 - TC1 .1612 .2045
Total Non-Coop Prob .5482 .4286
Distributed Work and Travel Behaviour: The Dynamics of Interactive Agency Choices between
Employers and Employees
Brewer & Hensher
29
Conclusions
The findings are new in terms of understanding both the decision to adopt and implement
telecommuting. The more flexible the work design under which the employee works, the
greater their willingness to telecommute. Time, place and distance are effective in
understanding how to make work more compatible with telecommuting from the employee's
perspective.
It is interesting that both employer and employee see work differently and are ` blinkered'
depending on the lens they are using (personal or organisational). For example, when it comes
to organisational interests employers make decisions in the light of what they see is `good' for
the organisation, and when it comes to employee interests, employees are more likely to see
`what's in it for them'. It may be worth considering that employee interests equate with the best
interests of the work organisation and employees are negotiating with both sets in mind.
Further, the findings demonstrate that employees and employers view work design
characteristics differently in terms of constraints on telecommuting. This differential perception
explains the managerial constraints on telecommuting.
This paper has introduced the idea of interactive agency choice into traveller behaviour and
distributed work choices where the linkages between actors or agents in the choice of work
practices (i.e. employee, employer) are best represented as interdependencies or less-than-fully
competitive actions which through negotiation and bargaining within sub choice sets produce
outcomes which may or may not be the utility maximisation  solution under independent
choosing. This approach reflects what we ‘observe’ actually occurring in practice compared to
a one-time survey.
The idea of interactive agency choice has wider application in many areas of transportation
decision making than has been assumed in the literature of traveller behaviour. Indeed the
interdependencies between individuals in a household and even between individuals in a
particular peer structure are examples of the potential failure of the in terdependency imposed
on nearly all discrete choice models in transportation  (there may be exceptions but we are not
aware of them, although DePalma and Lefevre (1983) recognised the issue many years ago).
Ongoing research is extending the choice set to include more distributed work options, as well
as endogenising the choice dependencies between an employee and other members of the
household. We are also evaluating alternative negotiation strategies such as interactive
simultaneity in which an employer and an employee each see the preferred offer of the other
party at the time of establishing an initial preference.
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Table 1: The Conceptualisation of Distributed Work in Time, Distance and Place: Assumptions and Artifacts of Work Design
Work Design
Dimensions
Time Distance Place
Assumptions effort:
physical,
emotional,
cognitive
organisational
. commitment
flexibility
between work
and home
visibility in the
work place
absenteeism recognition for
performance
promotion &
career path
productivity customer
service
use of resources
and facilities
costs of telecommuting
resources
Artifacts
Time
hours spent at work ´ ´ ´ ´ ´ ´ ´ ´
punctuality ´ ´ ´ ´ ´ ´ ´
travel time
Distance
contact with co-workers ´ ´ ´
contact with managers ´ ´ ´ ´ ´ ´
contact with customers ´
information network ´ ´ ´
division of work
between
´ ´ ´ ´ ´
home and workplace
supervision ´ ´ ´ ´ ´
Place
proximity ´ ´ ´ ´ ´ ´
shared space ´ ´
technological design ´ ´
e.g. email, voicemail,
Internet etc.
security of information ´ ´
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